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Abstract: The extent of publishing in predatory journals in economics is examined in 
this paper. A simple model of researcher behavior is presented to explore those factors 
motivating an economist or other academic to publish in predatory journals as defined by 
Beall (2015). Beall’s lists are used to identify predatory journals and publishers included 
in the Research Papers in Economics archives. Once identified, the affiliations of authors 
publishing in these outlets are determined in order to identify the characteristics of those 
publishing in predatory journals. The geographic dispersion of authorship is widespread. 
A very small subset of authors is registered on RePEc. Around forty-five percent of 
registered authors who publish in predatory journals in the data set have six or fewer 
publications. A surprising number of authors who are in the RePEc top 5% also published 
in predatory journals in 2015.  
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1. Introduction 
Within the educational system of the developed world, the distinguishing feature 
that sets universities apart from other components of the system is the expectation that 
faculty contribute to the knowledge base of their specialties. The growth of the Internet 
and, more generally, globalization have coincided with, or perhaps fostered, an increased 
emphasis on scholarly publishing in academia worldwide. Promotion, merit pay, tenure, 
and hiring and firing decisions in many universities depend on the publications of faculty 
members. Standards, of course, still differ within and across countries, but an institution 
that does not demand some evidence of scholarly activity is in the minority in most 
places, and a rarity in many. 
The increase in research output and extension of the Internet have been 
accompanied by an expansion in the number of journals. The open access journal model 
is a relatively inexpensive form for publishing scientific work contributing to the 
expansion in the number of outlets for scholarly communication [see West, Bergstrom, 
and Bergstrom, 2014, and the citations therein]. Certainly, many open access journals 
follow the ethical standards and practices one expects from traditional print journals. 
Most importantly, they have a thorough review process so that only those papers deemed 
to contribute to the body of knowledge in a discipline are actually accepted for 
publication.  
Regrettably, some open access outlets perform cursory reviews of submissions, 
with accepted papers published contingent on the authors’ payment of a substantial fee. 
Shen and Björk (2015) succinctly describe the process; “(n)ew innovative publishers 
repositioned themselves as service providers to the authors, publishing with them, rather 
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than seeing themselves as content providers to readers.”1 Jeffrey Beall maintains a list of 
journal publishers, and another list of stand-alone journals that perform little or no 
review, charge post-acceptance publication fees, and otherwise satisfy his criteria for 
classification as predatory at the Scholarly Open Access blog (http://scholarlyoa.com/). 
Of course, the pay-for-publication practice has a long history when applied to books, with 
this sector of book publishers pejoratively referred to as ‘vanity press.’ 
The extent of publishing in predatory journals in economics is examined in this 
paper.2 A simple theoretical model of academic publishing is constructed to better 
understand the motivation for publishing in predatory journals. Beall’s lists are then 
employed to identify predatory journals and publishers included in the Research Papers in 
Economics (RePEc) archives. It is assumed that a publisher on Beall’s list publishes only 
predatory journals since it is hard to imagine a viable business model in which a 
publisher has sufficiently lax standards in some journals so that they would be classified 
as predatory, and high standards for others. Once identified, the affiliations and other 
characteristics of authors publishing in these outlets are compiled.  
A priori, one might expect that most publications in predatory journals will be from 
inexperienced authors in junior ranks outside the industrialized countries since these 
countries are more likely to have low-ranked universities with weaker publishing 
standards than those in the developed world. This expectation is incorrect; authors 
publishing in the predatory journals listed on RePEc are geographically disbursed.   
																																																								
1 Shen and Björk (2015), p. 1. 
2 One of the authors recently served on his department’s recruitment committee. About half of the 
applicants had one or more publications in journals on Beall’s list of stand-alone predatory journals, or in 
journals published by a company on Beall’s list of predatory publishers.  
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Following the initial analysis, the focus shifts to the characteristics of RePEc 
registered authors in the larger data set. Although the subset of registered authors is much 
smaller, much more information can be gleaned from RePEc sources regarding the 
publication practices of this group of researchers. 
 
2. Literature 
Several studies have looked at publishing in open access journals. Bohannon (2013) 
submitted virtually identical papers on the anticancer properties of a type of lichen to 304 
open access journals. The methodology described in the paper was intentionally flawed in 
ways that should have been obvious and noted during a competent review. The paper was 
accepted by more than half of the journals to which it was submitted.  
Djuric (2015) discusses the academic setting in Serbia after 2007 when state 
universities began requiring publications in journals having Thomson Reuters (TR) 
impact factors for completion of a Ph.D or promotion. Djuric describes the submission of 
a sham paper to a journal having a TR impact factor in which “… hundreds of Serbian 
scientists published hundreds of articles …in only a couple of years.”3 The journal in 
question charges for publication after acceptance. The purpose of the sham paper was to 
test the authors’ impression that the journal conducted little if any review of submissions. 
The article was accepted the day after submission. No referee reports were provided with 
the acceptance e-mail. After payment of an invoice for €290, the journal scheduled 
publication. 
Shen and Björk (2015) draw a sample of journals from Beall’s lists of predatory 
journals and publishers to determine the characteristics of the journals and details of the 																																																								
3 Djuric (2015), p.184. 
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authors. Almost forty-five percent of the journals are published in India or North 
America. The publisher’s location could not be determined for nearly twenty-seven 
percent of the journals. In a separate sample of contributors, more than seventy-five 
percent of the authors are from Asia and Africa. The average article processing or 
publishing charge (APC) is $178. Xia (2015) compiles information on the APCs of 214 
journals on Beall’s list in early 2014. Most predatory journals he examines charge less 
than $100 for the APC, and few charged more than $200. 
Omobowale (2014) asserts that such criteria as impact factor are generally ignored 
in the evaluation of faculty publications when making appointment and promotion 
decisions in Nigerian universities. Instead, the primary criterion for promotion is whether 
the papers are in journals published outside Nigeria. He conducts interviews with thirty 
faculty members in two public universities to ascertain their views regarding publications 
in predatory journals. He also interviews eight senior Nigerian faculty involved in hiring 
and promotion in these same universities. The four most common reasons given for 
publishing in predatory journals are promotion of other faculty based on such 
publications, the desire for quick promotion, a lack of oversight in evaluations, and 
ignorance. It is noteworthy that three of the four justifications for publishing in predatory 
journals suggest an optimizing decision by a faculty member based on full information 
about the predatory journals and the promotion process, rather than a lack of knowledge 
regarding the quality of the target journal. 
Xia et al. (2015) are interested in the characteristics of authors publishing in 
predatory journals. They select seven pharmaceutical science journals on Beall’s list, 
referred to as group 1 in their discussion. Using the author data available from the 
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journals and the Web of Science, Xia et al. compile data on authors who published in one 
of the Beall’s list journals in 2013.  For comparison they select a second group of five 
open access, pharmaceutical journals that rejected Bohannon’s sham paper, and a third 
group of five open access journals with high impact factors from the Public Library of 
Science (PLoS). Xia et al. compile data on the authors of papers in these three groups of 
journals in 2013.4 None of the journals in the comparison groups appeared on Beall’s list 
at the time of the study. Their data show that 75% of predatory journal authors are from 
South Asia, especially India, and 14% are from Africa. About 15% of authors in the 
second group of journals and less than 5% of PLoS journal articles are by researchers in 
these two locations.  
 Xia et al. also find that group 1 authors have fewer publications and are cited less 
than group 2 authors, leading to their overall conclusion that the authors of articles in 
predatory journals are typically inexperienced and from developing countries. However, 
as discussed the data section, there are many authors publishing in predatory journals 
listed on RePEc who are neither inexperienced nor from developing countries. 
 
3. Theory 
3.1. Introduction 
What does a traditional journal do? Expanding on the succinct description of 
journals as ‘content providers to readers’ (Shen and Bjork, 2015), a traditional journal 
screens paper quality for its subscribers. So as not to impose the entire cost of screening 
on the reader, and, recognizing that publishing a paper creates a positive return to the 																																																								
4 Given the large number of papers in the PLoS journals they started with the first issue of each and 
compiled the author characteristics, stopping once they had data for 300 authors. 
	 7	
author(s), a submission fee is often required before a paper is assessed for quality. 
Revenue is derived from subscriptions, submission fees, and, perhaps, advertising. The 
upfront submission fee makes the editorial decision to accept or reject independent from 
the journal’s revenue source.  
What does a predatory journal do? Again, from Shen and Bjork (2015), the 
publisher has become a “service provider to the authors.” A predatory journal or 
publisher provides two services to authors; it offers a rapid decision, albeit based on a 
cursory or non-existent review of the paper, and it sells space in a journal to authors.5 If 
any screening for article quality takes place, it is limited, implying relatively high 
acceptance rates. An article processing charge is imposed on the author(s) after 
acceptance creating an incentive to accept papers in order to increase revenue. Predatory 
journals are open access so publication costs are relatively low compared to a print 
journal. The marginal cost of publishing a paper is likely very small. 
We abstract from journal behavior in this paper, instead focusing on the motivation 
of authors with a simple model. As noted in Section Two, at least for Nigerian faculty, 
three of the four reasons given for publishing in predatory journals suggest that authors 
recognize the low quality of predatory journals. 
In our model, papers are unpublished. Papers become publications. Suppose there 
are two kinds of papers: high quality and low quality. With nl the number of low quality 
papers, and nh the number of high quality papers produced by an author, the effort cost of 
producing papers is 𝑐 !!!!  for high quality papers, and !!!!  for low quality papers, with c > 1.  
																																																								
5 For a particularly egregious case see Mazieres and Kohler (2005) and the related story in 
https://scholarlyoa.com/2014/11/20/bogus-journal-accepts-profanity-laced-anti-spam-paper/. We thank 
Nick Sisto for making us aware of this paper. 
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All papers have a 100% chance of being published in bad (predatory) journals.6 
Low quality papers have zero chance of being published in good journals.7 High quality 
papers have a probability of θ of being published in good journals, where θ ∈ [0,1] is a 
measure of individual ability. Thus a high quality paper will be published in a bad journal 
with a probability of 1-θ. 
Universities value the quality-weighted number of articles, and will pay v for a 
quality-weighted article. Thus, compensation is given by  
v[α (# of publications in good journals) + (1-α) (# of publications in bad journals)], with 
½ < α < 1. It is assumed that publications in good journals are never valued less than 
publications in bad journals, so ½ < α. If α = ½, all publications would be valued the 
same. If α = 1, only publications in good journals would be valued. Clearly both v and α 
may vary across universities. 
For simplicity, assume an author can only work on one type of paper.8 First, 
consider an individual who produces high quality papers. The individual’s objective is: 
 max!! 𝑣𝑛! 𝛼𝜃 +  1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃 −  !"!!!                                              (1)                                            
 
We then have: 																																																								
6 Allowing for the fact that some papers do not get published anywhere would not materially affect the 
results. 
7 There are low quality journals that are not predatory in which many scholars appear to have a high 
probability of getting an article published. We are aware of one such journal with a published acceptance 
rate of around 25%. If most of the scholars we know have almost certainty in acceptance, then there must 
be many papers submitted to these journals that are truly low quality assuming accuracy of the acceptance 
rate. Such journals fall under our category of “good.” 
8 One way to justify this assumption is if there is a fixed cost of producing high quality papers, a cost for 
which a university compensates a professor. For example, summer research support may be taken away if a 
sufficient number of good journal articles is not produced. 	
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 nh = 
!! 𝛼𝜃 +  1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃 .                                                                 (2)                                                               
 
Now consider an individual who produces low quality papers. The author’s 
objective is: 
 
 max!! 𝑣 1− 𝛼 𝑛! −  !!!! , yielding                                                       (3)                                                                 
  
nl = v(1-α).                                                                                                (4)                                
 
 
3.2. How would behavior differ for similar individuals producing different types of 
papers? 
Suppose individuals with the same value of θ are employed at institutions with the 
same values of v and α, but where some are provided the support to produce high quality 
papers (see footnote eight), and others do not receive such support. We first consider who 
would produce more papers, which also means more publications since all papers are 
published by assumption. Using eqs. (2) and (4), individuals producing high quality 
papers would produce more papers and publications (in good and bad journals) than 
individuals producing low quality papers if: 
 
 𝛼𝜃 +  1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃  > c 1− 𝛼 .                                                                    (5)  
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If α = ½, all publications are valued the same so LHS(5) = ½ <  RHS(5) = c/2. Thus 
fewer high quality papers are produced than low quality papers. Even if a lump sum 
payment, such as a summer research grant, were given to those who produced high 
quality papers, when α = ½, there would still be more low quality papers produced than 
high quality papers, and there would be more total publications by those who produced 
low quality papers than by those producing high quality papers. The survey results 
reported by Omobowale appear to suggest a value of α ≈ ½ in the universities he studied 
in Nigeria. If α = 1 there is no value to low quality papers so LHS(5) = θ and             
RHS(5) = 0.Without reward for publications in bad journals, no one would produce low 
quality papers. The model thus suggests that the institutions employing researchers are 
complicit, in part, in publishing in predatory journals. We address possible reasons for 
this complicity later in the paper. 
Let us also consider the midpoint of the range for α, α = ¾. Then LHS(5) = ¼ + 
!!, 
and RHS(5) = 
!!. If θ > !!!!  then LHS(5) > RHS(5), so those who produce good papers would 
produce more papers and publications than individuals producing low quality papers. 
With the maximum value of θ equal to one and c < 3, some individuals producing high 
quality papers would produce more papers and publications than they would if they 
produced low quality papers. These results suggest that for a high enough level of ability, 
θ, and a high enough reward for publications in good journals versus publications in bad 
journals, α, one would produce more papers and publications focusing on high quality 
papers than on low quality papers, even though the former are more costly to produce. 
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Again consider those with the same θ who are employed at institutions with the 
same values of v and α, where only some are provided the support to produce high 
quality papers. Would the same individual have more publications in bad journals by 
focusing on low quality papers than high quality papers? One who produces low quality 
papers has v(1-α) publications in bad journals, and the number published in bad journals 
if the same person produced high quality papers is !(!!!)! 𝛼𝜃 + 1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃 . 
Focusing on low quality papers would result in more publications in bad journals if: 
 
 c(1-α) > 1− 𝜃 𝛼𝜃 +  1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃 .                                                           (6) 
 
 If α = ½, LHS(6) = 
!! > RHS(6) = !!!! , but, if α = 1, LHS(6) = 0 < RHS(6) = θ(1-θ). 
Suppose α = ¾, so publications in good journals are rewarded three times as much as are 
publications in bad journals. If α = ¾, LHS(6) > RHS(6) when c > (1-θ)(1+2θ). Now  
(1-θ)(1+2θ) is maximized when θ = ¼ and (1-θ)(1+2θ) = 1.125. Thus, unless c is very 
low or α is very high, it is likely that individuals with the same θ, facing the same v, and 
producing low quality papers would have more publications in bad journals than those 
who produce high quality papers. If α is very high, there is little reward for publications 
in low quality journals, so few low quality papers would be produced.  
Conversely, using equation (2):  
 
 !!!!"  = !! 2𝜃 − 1 .                                                                                                  (7) 
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 Thus, at least for those with θ  > ½, an increase in α increases the number of high 
quality papers produced and means more publications in bad and good journals for those 
who produce high quality papers. 
 
3.3. When would individuals choose papers of different qualities? 
We have considered how individuals with the same ability, θ, and with the same 
payoffs for publication would differ depending on whether they produced high or low 
quality papers. Now we examine individuals who differ in θ, but face the same α and v, 
in order to see who would choose to produce either high or low quality papers, given that 
one would have the support to produce high quality papers (footnote eight). Using   
eqs.(1) – (4), the payoffs from producing high or low quality papers, πh and πl 
respectively, are: 
 
 πh = 
!! !"! !!! !!! !!! ,                                                                                       (8) 
 πl = 
!! !!! !! .                                                                                                        (9) 
 
Canceling terms and taking the square root of both sides yields eq.(10), which 
shows that the payoff to producing high quality papers exceeds that for low quality 
papers, πh  > πl, if: 
 
 θ  > !!! !!/!!!!!!!  ≡ θ*.                                                                                       (10) 
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Now lim!→!/! 𝜃∗ = ∞. Then θ  < θ*, and all would produce low quality papers if 
good and bad publications were rewarded the same. At the other extreme, lim!→! 𝜃∗ = 0, 
so that all would produce high quality papers if there were no reward for publications in 
bad journals. 
 Two factors have affected scholarship in recent years, particularly in business 
schools. First, for purposes of accreditation, publications per se for each faculty member 
have become more important, suggesting a decrease in α so that low ability faculty can 
meet publishing standards established for accreditation purposes. Second, acceptance 
rates at good journals appear to have declined.9 In our model, we can interpret the 
decrease in acceptance rates as an increase in c; it is more costly to produce high quality 
papers that might be accepted in good journals. Clearly !"∗!"  < 0, and !"∗!"  > 0, showing that 
a decrease in α or an increase in c raises θ*, causing more individuals to focus on low 
quality papers that will be published in bad journals.  
 
4. Data  
A list of journals showing the aggregate ranking for the last ten years on RePEc was 
downloaded on December 13, 2015. The list contained 1642 journals and the names of 
each journal’s publisher. The list was reviewed to identify journals or publishers 
appearing on one of Beall’s lists. Thirty-nine journals from eighteen different publishers 
on the RePEc list are considered predatory in Beall’s classification.10 By their standings 
																																																								
9 Card and DellaVigna (2013) find that acceptance rates have fallen at the American Economic Review 
(from 13.8% to 8.1%), Econometrica (from 27.1% to 8.5%), and the Journal of Political Economy (from 
13.3% to 4.8%) between 1976-1980 and 2011-2012. 
10 Again, any journal from a publisher on Beall’s list is considered predatory in this study. The criteria used 
by Beall can be downloaded from https://scholarlyoa.com/publishers/  
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in the RePEc aggregate rankings, some of these journals might be considered good 
journals. Six of the predatory journals are ranked at number 500 or better and three are in 
the top 20% of RePEc journals by the aggregate ranking measure. 
Acceptance rates are not available on the homepage for most of the journals in the 
data set. Just a third of the thirty-nine journals report acceptance rates, and these range 
from 5% to 62% for 2015. The six journals that report rates between 5% and 25% 
provide no supporting data. Six others show data on submissions and acceptances on their 
homepages allowing calculation of acceptance rates that range from 39% to 61%. The 
other journal reports a 62% rate but no other data are provided. 11 
After identification of the predatory journals, authors and titles of papers published 
by each journal in 2015 and appearing on RePEc were pasted into an Excel file on 
December 27, 2015. Over the next two months, each available 2015 issue of each 
predatory journal was reviewed to identify the affiliations of authors and, in cases of 
authors registered on RePEc, the number of publications of the author(s). By the time 
some journals were reviewed, additional issues of the journal had appeared on RePEc. In 
such instances the data set was not updated. Thus the data file generally does not include 
all papers published in 2015 by each journal, and journals/publishers that promptly 
submit issues to RePEc will be overrepresented in the data set compared to those that 
delay their RePEc submissions.  
																																																								
11 Dates of initial submission and acceptance appear on some published papers that were examined during 
the course of data collection, and reinforce the notion of less-than-thorough referee reviews by the 
predatory journals. Many papers that were individually examined had been accepted within a month or less 
of the initial submission. One paper had been submitted just two days before acceptance. What papers are 
rejected by these journals? Our conjecture is that some papers are so poorly written in English that they can 
quickly be rejected after an editor reads a small portion of the paper. 
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Since the group of journals is restricted to those listed on RePEc, it should not be 
considered representative of the population of predatory publishers/journals. An implicit 
assumption of this study is that any journal listed in Research Papers in Economics is an 
economics journal. However, the titles of many articles suggest that not all authors are 
economists. One of the characteristics used by Jeffrey Beall to identify a predatory 
publisher is that the journal is “excessively broad … to attract more articles,” (Beall, 
2015), and thus published papers outside the usual scope of economics do appear in the 
data set.  
Due to variations in lags between publication of an issue and its appearance on 
RePEc, the data set excludes some predatory journals listed on RePEc. Many journals 
had no 2015 issues on RePEc when the data were compiled so the final data set includes 
twenty-seven predatory journals with publications in 2015. Of these twenty-seven 
journals, the number of 2015 papers from each journal in the data set ranges from one to 
two hundred and thirty-six for a total of 1284 published papers in predatory journals.  
Two characteristics of each author were identified from the initial examination of 
papers; the country in which the author’s affiliated institution is located, and whether the 
author is registered on RePEc. If registered on RePEc, the number of each registered 
author’s publications appearing on RePEc is recorded. There are 2774 authors in the data 
set. Note that there are individual authors with more than one paper in the data set for 
predatory journals so the total number of authors exceeds the number of individuals. 
Variations in how an author’s name might appear on a paper led us to forgo any attempt 
to determine the number of different authors in the overall data set. However, we also 
examine more closely the much smaller subset of RePEc registered authors, and 
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readdress this issue. This portion of the data collection process was completed on 
February 28, 2016.  
The next step was to calculate the total number of authors and papers from each 
country. Two compilation issues arose. Many papers had coauthors affiliated with 
institutions in different countries. Letting n represent the number of authors, we assigned 
!! share of the authorship to the country of each author. Thus, the country of the first 
author and those of subsequent authors are weighted equally. In some instances a single 
author had affiliations across countries. Letting m represent the number of affiliations, the 
country associated with each affiliation was assigned !! share in a single authored paper. 
A few authors had affiliations in different countries and were coauthors with researchers 
from other countries. In such cases the country’s share for each affiliated institution was 
!!".  
A surprising and unexpected result is the widespread geographic distribution of 
authors. Authors appearing in the data set are affiliated with institutions in ninety 
countries. Azerbaijan, Benin, Cuba, Ethiopia, Kosovo, Malawi, Malta, New Zealand, 
Rwanda, and Senegal are each represented by a single author. Table 1 shows the numbers 
of published papers and authors from the five countries most represented in the data. 
Contrary to the findings of Xia et al. (2015) for pharmaceutical journals, no country or 
region appears to dominate publishing in predatory journals on RePEc; the practice is 
widespread. Eight countries, the five listed in the table plus Pakistan, Kenya, and China 
account for nearly 50% of all publications in these journals, and slightly more than half of 
all authors. 
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Table 1: Countries Ordered by Number of Authors and Publications 
Country Number of 
Papers 
Percent of 
Total 
Country Number of 
Authors 
Percent of 
Total 
Iran 108     8.42% Iran 279 10.06% 
US 106 8.29 US 218 7.88 
Nigeria 93 7.21 Nigeria 204 7.34 
Turkey 90 7.04 Malaysia 186 6.69 
Malaysia 73 5.68 Turkey 176 6.34 
 
Again, it should be emphasized that the data are not from a random sample of 
predatory journals. Some journals seem to attract most of their papers from authors in a 
small subset of countries. For example, half of the twenty-four authors affiliated with 
South Korean universities published in a single journal. An obvious conjecture is that, 
once an author learns of an ‘easy’ publication outlet, he/she informs like-minded 
colleagues so that reputation affects the geographic distribution of submissions. 
As noted earlier, a characteristic of some predatory journals is their very broad 
scope, often reflected in the name. The International Journal of Academic Research in 
Business and Social Sciences and the Asian Journal of Empirical Research are two 
examples of journals in this data set with very broad topic areas. Thus it may not be 
surprising that many authors who have publications in the data set are not RePEc 
registered authors since many are unlikely to be economists. Only 124 individual authors, 
about 5% of the total number of authors in the data set, are registered with RePEc. RePEc 
registered individuals are authors or coauthors of 148 papers, more than 11% of the 1284 
published papers in the data set. 
Using RePEc data, we compile additional information on the subset of registered 
authors. In addition to the name and country of affiliation, for each registered author we 
also obtain the total number of publications, the number of publications in predatory 
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journals, the date of the first publication, and whether RePEc ranks the author in the top 
5%.12 Registered authors published in eighteen of the twenty-seven predatory journals 
with 2015 publications in the data set.  
The data subset contains information on 124 registered authors with 148 
publications in predatory journals in 2015. These authors have a total of 3015 published 
papers, a mean of 24 publications per author, with 310 of these, slightly more than 10%, 
in predatory journals.13 Although most papers are co-authored, the majority of 
publications have just one RePEc-registered author. A few authors have more than one 
2015 publication in the data set. One registered author has four published papers in 2015 
in our data set of predatory journals, and four others have three publications. Twenty-
seven of the 124 registered authors are top 5% authors in RePEc. Thus nearly 22% of the 
subset of registered authors who published in a predatory journal in 2015 are top 5% 
authors.  
One top 5% author has eleven total publications, eight of which are in predatory 
journals. Another has thirteen published papers with five of these in predatory journals. 
Several other authors have achieved the top 5% ranking, yet appear to have an 
insufficient number of publications in high quality journals to justify the rank. RePEc 
rankings depend on citations, impact factors, and other criteria [see Zimmerman, 2015]. 
We do not explore the curious fact that authors with relatively few publications have 																																																								
12 Data collection for the subset of registered authors began on July 9 and ended on July 25, 2016. Each 
author’s RePEc publications were reviewed to collect the additional information on publications. A count 
was made of the number of publications in predatory journals for each individual, regardless of date of 
publications. Thus the number of papers published in predatory journals includes those from 2015 as well 
as publications prior to 2015 and some in 2016. 
13 Publications in non-predatory outlets are not necessarily journals in the RePEc database. Official reports, 
for example, are treated as publications. Separating papers in journals from others that RePEc also 
considers publications would have been a difficult and subjective task. Thus we refer to any paper shown as 
a publication in RePEc as a journal publication. Note that books and book chapters appear in separate 
categories in RePEc, so our data do not include these items. 
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achieved the top 5% ranking in this paper, but simply conjecture that either some authors 
or predatory journals, or both are ‘gaming’ the rankings. 
Ten registered authors have just one published paper, the one in the predatory 
journal. Forty-six registered authors have between two and six total publications, and 
thirteen have between seven and ten published papers. Seventeen authors have more than 
50 total publications, and eight of these have more than 100 published papers. Every 
registered author with more than 50 publications is a top 5% author. One top 5% author 
has sixteen publications listed in predatory journals in the RePEc data; no other registered 
author in the data set has more than nine. The 124 authors have a median of eight total 
publications, with a median of two published papers in predatory journals, suggesting that 
predatory journal publications are important for the typical author. 
Authors are affiliated with institutions in 35 different countries reflecting the 
geographic dispersion found in the data set for all authors. Table 2 shows the number of 
registered authors by country affiliation for the eight countries with the most registered 
authors. Slightly more than half of all registered authors in our data set are from these 
eight countries. As with the full data set of all authors, the US, Turkey, Nigeria, and 
Malaysia are four of the countries having the most registered authors with publications in 
predatory journals. Every continent except Antarctica and South America is represented 
in the data on registered authors. 	 	
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Table	2:	Countries	of	Institutions	with	the	Most	Registered	Authors	Country	 Number	of	registered	authors	US	 12	Turkey	 11	India	 9	UK	 7		Pakistan	 7	Nigeria	 7	Italy	 6	Malaysia	 6	Totals	 		65			
The date of the first publication allows a rough assessment of the research 
experience of each registered author. In particular we would like to know whether most 
economists publishing in predatory journals are relatively inexperienced, and thus, 
perhaps, are somewhat ignorant of publishing standards, or are starting careers by seeking 
publication quantity over quality in research output. The median period for the first 
publication is 2009-2010. Thus half the authors have 6+ years of experience since their 
first published paper. If the trajectory of the median author follows that of a typical 
faculty member in a US university, and, assuming the first published paper occurred not 
long after finishing the Ph.D, he/she would be applying for tenure and promotion to 
associate or have recently been considered.14 The 2009-2010 median date suggests that at 
least 50% of the authors have substantial research experience. Twenty-three of the 
registered authors had their first published paper before 2000, and thus might be regarded 
as very experienced researchers.15  
																																																								
14 We assume that most registered authors have doctorates. 
15 Alternatively the number of publications could be used as a proxy for research experience. Twenty-one 
registered authors have more than forty published papers, a group we regard as highly experienced. 
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Thus it does not appear that most economists publishing in predatory journals tend 
to be inexperienced. Furthermore, the simple correlation between the date of the first 
publication and the number of published papers in predatory journals is -.022 suggesting 
that ignorance of publishing standards due to inexperience is not the primary reason 
authors publish in predatory journals. Finally, there is a correlation of .303 between the 
number of total publications and the number of publications in predatory journals. 
Although it might be expected that authors with more publications also have more 
publications in predatory journals, the positive correlation also suggests that registered 
authors are do not become less likely to target predatory publication outlets as they gain 
experience in publishing. This impression is reinforced by a correlation of .255 between 
publications in predatory journals and those in non-predatory journals. This correlation 
reinforces the analysis in subsection 3.2 suggesting that those with low ability (θ) who 
focus on low quality papers have more total publications than those who produce high 
quality papers when there is a greater reward for publications in bad journals (1-α), and 
when the cost (c) of producing high quality papers that could be published in good 
journals is large.	
The surprise from the data is the large number of highly experienced authors with 
publications in predatory journals. As previously noted, twenty-seven registered authors 
are top 5% authors in RePEc. These top 5% authors have 2120 total publications, a mean 
of 79 publications per author, of which 104, or 4.9%, are in predatory journals. The top 
5% authors have published less frequently in predatory journals than the all-registered 
authors group. Top 5% authors are also dispersed geographically. Institutions in Taiwan, 
Australia, and the US each account for three of the top 5% authors. Two each work in 
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Germany, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, and Turkey. Eight other countries have one top 5% 
author.  
What might motivate an experienced economist to publish in a predatory journal? 
One possibility is that an inexperienced coauthor handled the submission and the 
experienced author was ignorant of the journal’s low quality. In most cases it is 
impossible to reject this hypothesis, but ten of the thirty-one papers published by top 5% 
authors in predatory journals in 2015 are single authored pieces, and another has two co-
authors, both of whom are in the top 5% RePEc, so ignorance cannot be the only 
explanation. Furthermore, one top 5% economist was a coauthor on three of the papers 
published in predatory journals in the data set of 2015 publications, and six others in the 
5% group had two coauthored papers in predatory journals. Apparently at least some of 
the top 5% authors are aware of the nature of these journals, but choose to publish in 
these outlets regardless of quality.  
For those top 5% authors not being misled by inexperienced coauthors, what would 
such experienced researchers gain from low quality publications? One possibility is a 
relatively low value of α at their institutions. As suggested earlier, a low α can benefit a 
school in two ways. First, it makes it easier for low quality authors to achieve publication 
standards established for accreditation purposes. Second, a lower α increases the number 
of publications of an author producing low quality papers, increasing both the RePEc 
ranking of the individual and that of the affiliated institution. Indeed if those who 
evaluate a faculty member’s annual performance do not examine each publication, and 
instead use an overall RePEc ranking as a measure of performance, then a publication in 
a predatory journal indexed on RePEc will enhance the individual’s reward. Among the 
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twenty-seven top 5% authors, there is a correlation of .336 between the number of 
predatory publications and the date of the first publication, meaning that more 
experienced top 5% authors (those with earlier first publication dates) tend to have fewer 
predatory publications. The positive correlation may mean that younger top 5% authors 
have elected to pursue publications in predatory journals in part to boost their RePEc 
rankings. Unlike the results for all registered authors, the correlation between 
publications in predatory journals and published papers in non-predatory journals is just 
.087, suggesting that those ranked in the top 5% are neither more nor less likely to select 
predatory outlets. 
 
5. Conclusions  
Unlike the results found by Xia et al. (2015) for pharmaceutical journals, we find 
that authors of articles in predatory journals indexed in RePEc are widely dispersed 
geographically. The papers in our selective data set are from authors in ninety different 
countries, although just eight countries account for about 50% of the papers and authors. 
The broad subject area of a typical predatory journal, attracting papers from many fields 
outside economics, may explain why only 124 of all authors in the data set are registered 
in RePEc. We view this result as a positive one since it suggests that only a small number 
of active researchers in economics are publishing in predatory journals. Of course, our 
sample is not a random one of predatory journals that publish papers on economic topics, 
so further work is required to verify this conjecture. 
The inclusion of predatory journals on RePEc is problematic. Indeed some of the 
predatory journals prominently display the RePEc logo on their web pages or report their 
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RePEc impact factors in an apparent attempt to signal high quality due to the affiliation 
with RePEc. More troubling is the apparent manipulation of the RePEc rankings through 
publishing in predatory journals even by economists ranked in the top 5% on RePEc. 
Since only 124 authors of the papers in our data set are registered in RePEc, the problem 
appears small at the moment, but it certainly has the potential to worsen unless the 
employing institutions remove the incentives for publishing in predatory journals. 
Although the task appears challenging, RePEc can also contribute by establishing 
minimum quality criteria to be met by journals indexed in its archives.16  
																																																								
16 To their credit, those who manage RePEc are aware of these issues and taking steps to address them. A 
recent post on the RePEc blog requests a volunteer to chair a committee on journal quality. 
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